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A GAME THEORETIC MODEL OF WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
JUAN PABLO PINASCO, MAURO RODRIGUEZ CARTABIA, NICOLAS SAINTIER
Abstract. In this work we consider an agent based model in order to study
the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a
symmetric zero sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of
play trying to learn the optimal one. Here, the agents use mixed strategies.
We study this model using both simulations and theoretical tools. We derive
the equations for the learning mechanism, and we show that the mean strategy
of the population satisfies an equation close to the classical replicator equation.
Concerning the wealth distribution, there are two interesting situations de-
pending on the equilibrium of the game. If the equilibrium is a pure strategy,
the wealth distribution is fixed after some transient time, and those players
which are close to optimal strategy are richer. When the game has an equi-
librium in mixed strategies, the stationary wealth distribution is close to a
Gamma distribution with variance depending on the coefficients of the game
matrix. We compute theoretically their second moment in this case.
1. Introduction
The stability through time and societies of the wealth distribution in a population
has attracted a lot of attention since Pareto’s seminal work [12]. Different empirical
studies show that in many economies the distribution of wealth follows a Pareto
distribution (a power law) in the high-income range, and a Gibbs, a Gamma or a
log-normal distribution in the bulk-range. We refer the reader to Chapter 2 in [2]
for a review of the empirical data available.
These empirical results has given rise to theoretical efforts trying to explain this
remarkable universality of the wealth distribution. In particular, recent advances
in computer technology allowed the study of this phenomenon computationally by
using agent-based models. The main idea consists in consider that the distribution
of wealth across the population results from simple repeated interactions between
individuals. This is reminiscent of the kinetic theory of gases where the particles
composing some gas interact binary at random exchanging energy at each inter-
action, and, as a result of the interactions, the systems tends to some stationary
state as time increases. The analogy consists then in thinking of a population as
composed of many agents, and when two agents interacts, they exchange money fol-
lowing some pre-established rule. The wealth distribution is expected to approach
some stationary state, which is expected to look similar as the wealth distribution
empirically observed if the interaction rule is appropriately chosen. There are many
numerical and theoretical studies which shows that this kind of models can repro-
duce the curves observed in wealth distribution, in particular the Pareto tail and
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the exponential or Gamma-like bulk-distribution, see for instance Chapter 4 in [2]
for a detailed review of different models.
Two main criticism of these models inspired by and analyzed with statistical
mechanics arguments comes from the fact that agents are considered as identical
dummy particles and hence they are not acting rationally trying to improve their
wealth. Also, they interact always in the same way and thus they cannot modify or
adapt their behaviour. This is in a sharp contrast with economical models, where
game theory provides a powerful framework to study interactions between rational
agents through games in which the players can choose among different actions or
strategies.
In this article we propose a model of wealth distribution taking advantage of both
the simplicity of the statistical physics models, and the flexibility of evolutionary
game theory. This approach to conflict resolution in the animal kingdom was
proposed in the late ’70s by John Maynard Smith, and it enables the players to
modify its behavior trying to adapt their way of play against the strategies of others
players, see for instance [4, 7, 16] for comprehensive introductions in this subject.
In our model, agents interact pairwise, playing some zero sum game, and the
outcome of the game defines the money exchange between them. More general
games requires some renormalization, since money is not conserved, as in [11]. Also,
the agents update their strategies based on this outcome, following some adaptive
mechanism that we introduce below.
We assume that each player has a mixed strategy, and they will increment or
decrease the probability to play some strategies according to the result of the last
game they played. This is a Pavlovian type of agent, introduced by D. and V.
Kraines in [8], which has a limited forecast of the game, and react myopically.
Despite that this kind of behavior has been used in many works, specially through
simulations, see [1, 17, 18], a theoretical analysis is lack, and we provide here the
corresponding dynamics whenever finitely many agents are involved. This strategic
update has an independent interest, and we study here their main properties. In
particular, we show that the mean strategy of the population obeys an equation
close to the replicator equation introduced by Taylor and Jonker [19] (see also
[6, 20]).
We present both theoretical and computational arguments which confirms that
this model reproduce the main features of the observed wealth distribution. Also,
by scaling the game payoff we obtain an analogue of the saving propensity: let us
recall that in [3], a family of parameters {λi}1≤i≤N is introduced, and player i is
willing to exchange a fraction λiwi of its wealth, without exposing the remaining
(1 − λi)wi, see the review [13] for a detailed analysis of the influence of saving
propensities on the shape of the equilibrium wealth distribution. As we will show
in the paper, the payoff scaling influence the wealth distribution in similar ways,
by changing the mean and variance of the equilibrium distributions.
Finally, let us remark that previous models considered some gambling process
associated to the money exchange process, see [5, 14, 15]. However, the outcome of
the random game was externally determined, and agent’s expectations were always
the same, since they cannot improve their chances in the game.
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Our paper is organized as follows. In Section §2 we describe the model, and in
Section §3 we present the theoretical results on the evolutionary mechanism. In
Section §4 we present some examples of this dynamic. Section §5 is devoted to the
wealth distribution, and we compare the theoretical predictions with our computer
simulations. We close the paper with some conclusions and comments in Section
§6.
2. Description of the model
Let us consider a toy model of a closed economic system where the total amount
of money and the total number N of agents are fixed. No changes occur in those
variables: no production, neither migration, nor death or birth of agents, and the
only economic activity is restricted to trading. We denote the wealth of agent i by
wi, which is always a nonnegative real number.
2.1. Mechanism of a trade. Let us first describe the trade mechanism. Trades
take place between two agents. They play a game whose payoff matrix G will
indicate how wealth is transferred between them. We consider only zero-sum games,
and therefore the gain of one agent is the loss of the other. This will ensure that
the wealth is conserved. The winner will receive some fraction of the wealth of the
other, this fraction depends on the game and the strategies selected by the players.
2.1.1. The game. We assume we have a symmetric zero sum game. Each agent has
a common set of K possible actions (or pure strategies) labeled s1, . . . , sK . The
game matrix G = (glm) ∈ RK×K has entries glm ∈ [−1, 1], and glm = −gml for
any 1 ≤ l,m ≤ K. Let us note that this is not a serious restriction, since any zero
sum game can be extended to a symmetric game, where each agent is randomly
assigned as the row or column player.
Agent i has a private probability distribution p(i) = (p
(i)
1 , . . . , p
(i)
K ) on the actions,
where p
(i)
l is the probability that agent i chooses the pure strategy sl, with 1 ≤ l ≤
K. We have 0 ≤ p(i)l ≤ 1 for any 1 ≤ l ≤ K and p(i)1 + ...+ p(i)K = 1 for any agent i.
In each time step, two agents i and j are randomly selected with uniform prob-
ability, and they play some strategies selected with their respective private proba-
bilities distributions.
2.1.2. Wealth interchange. Let us assume that i plays sl, and j plays sm. Then, i
will receive the fraction glm of the wealth wj of j if glm ≥ 0; otherwise i will give
to j the fraction gml of its own wealth wi.
Hence, the post-interaction wealth w∗i and w
∗
j are defined as follows:{
w∗i = wi + ∆
w∗j = wj −∆
where ∆ := g+lmwj − g−lmwi. (1)
Here, x+ := max{x, 0} and x− := max{−x, 0} .
Observe that glm ∈ [−1, 1] implies that the wealth of each agent remains non-
negative, while condition GT = −G implies that the trade mechanism is symmetric
in the sense that the role of the players is unimportant. In particular, the diagonal
elements of G are 0, and if both players choose the same strategy then there are no
money transfer.
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A more realistic model must introduce some degree of risk aversion. An usual
approach [3, 13] is to assign a saving propensity λi ∈ [0, 1] to each player, and in
the trade player i is willing to exchange only the fraction λiwi of its wealth. Here,
we consider this situation by re-scaling the game using a parameter ε ∈ [0, 1], and
we have {
w∗i = wi + ∆ε
w∗j = wj −∆ε
where ∆ε := ε(g
+
lmwj − g−lmwi).
This have two possible interpretations: it is equivalent to change the game matrix
to εG, obtaining a less dangerous game since lower fractions of wealth are at risk; or
each player is exposing the fraction εw of its wealth. Of course, ε can be randomly
selected from some distribution in each trade; and also each player can have its own
value ε.
2.2. Adaptive process. We assign to each player an initial probability vector
p(i) = (p
(i)
1 , · · · , p(i)K ), which correspond to its mixed strategy, and let us fix some
small value δ > 0.
We assume that all the agents will update their mixed strategies {p(i)}1≤i≤N
trying to increase the pay-off in future trades. Now, the Pavlovian character of
the agents means that according to the outcome of the game they will slightly
increase (respectively, decrease) by δ the probability of playing the successful (resp.,
unsuccessful) strategy used in that game.
More precisely, we have the following updating rules: whenever agents i and j
play strategies sl and sm respectively, and ∆ is given in equation (1),
if ∆ > 0 then

δ(i) = min{δ, p(i)m }
δ(j) = min{δ, p(j)m }
p
(i)∗
l = p
(i)
l + δ
(i), p
(i)∗
m = p
(i)
m − δ(i)
p
(j)∗
l = p
(j)
l + δ
(j), p
(j)∗
m = p
(j)
m − δ(j),
if ∆ < 0 then

δ(i) = min{δ, p(i)l }
δ(j) = min{δ, p(j)l }
p
(i)∗
l = p
(i)
l − δ(i), p(i)∗m = p(i)m + δ(i)
p
(j)∗
l = p
(j)
l − δ(j), p(j)∗m = p(j)m + δ(j).
(2)
Clearly, δ(i) = δ unless the winning (resp., loosing) strategy has probability 1
(resp., 0), because in these cases the update procedure fails to give a true probability
vector.
In order to simplify the simulations, we can fix some positive number M ∈ N, and
now we choose δ = 1/M . If we assign to each player an initial probability vector
p(i) such that their components are integer multiples of δ, the update process is
simpler, since δ = δ(i) = δ(j) unless the player strategy has reached the values 0 or
1.
2.3. The algorithm. The pseudo code in Algorithm 1 can be easily implemented
in any programming language. We have implemented it and run our simulations in
GNU Octave [9].
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Let us note that Step 1 can be replaced by choosing one of the agents sequentially
from 1 to N , and selecting only the second agent at random. The results in both
cases are strongly similar.
Algorithm 1: pseudo code
Data:
K ∈ N: number of actions or pure strategies,
G ∈ RK×K : antisymmetric matrix with coefficients in [−1, 1].
N ∈ N: number of agents.
T ∈ N: total number of trades.
δ > 0 small (to be used in (2))
Initialization: for each agent i = 1, . . . , N , initialize its wealth wi ≥ 0 and
its mixed strategy p(i).
for t = 1, . . . , T do
1. Select uniformly at random two agents i and j.
2. For agent i, choose at random a pure strategy following its probabilities
p
(i)
1 , . . . , p
(i)
K .
3. Do the same for agent j.
4. Update their wealth wi and wj following (1).
5. Update their probabilities following (2).
end
Result: final wealth wi and mixed strategy p
(i) of each agent i ≤ i ≤ N .
3. Evolutionary game theory
Let us fix some generic player i, and let us study the evolution of the mixed
strategy p(i)(t).
For notational convenience, let us introduce the mean strategy of the population,
p¯ = N−1
∑
i
p(i).
Also, let us introduce a matrix H = (hlm)1≤l,m≤K , depending on G as follows:
hlm =
 1 if glm > 00 if glm = 0−1 if glm < 0
Let us note that only the sign of ∆ matters in the update rule given in equation
(2). Incidentally, it will have important consequences on the convergence of the
mean strategy.
Let us assume that a trade occurs following a Poisson distribution with parameter
λ = 1. So, the probability that an interaction occurs in the time interval (t, t+ dt)
is 1−e−dt. We compute now the expected change of the probability p(i)l that player
i assigns to action sl in its mixed strategy.
Observe that player i is selected with probability 2/N (it is the first or the
second player), and it plays the pure strategy sn with probability p
(i)
n (t). Another
arbitrary player j is selected at random with probability (N − 1)−1, and it will
play the pure strategy sm with probability p
(j)
m (t). After the game, the probability
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p
(i)
l (t) is changed by δ
(i)hlm when i plays strategy l, or by −δ(i)hnl if i plays a
different strategy and the rival plays sl.
Recall that δ(i) is allowed to be zero to prevent a value outside [0, 1], depending
on the values of and p
(i)
l (t) and p
(i)
m (t); we will omit the supraindex for notational
simplicity.
We get the following master equation, where eTl denotes the transposed l-th
canonical vector:
p
(i)
l (t+ dt) =p
(i)
l (t) + 2dtδN
−1
[∑
m6=l
p
(i)
l (t)hlm
( 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
p(j)m (t)
)]
− 2dtδN−1
[∑
n 6=l
p(i)n (t)hnl
( 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
p
(j)
l (t)
)]
=p
(i)
l (t) + 2dtδN
−1p(i)l (t)e
T
l H
( 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
p(j)(t)
)
− 2dtδN−1p(i)(t)Hel
( 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
p
(j)
l (t)
)
,
where we have used that hll = 0 in the last step.
Therefore, when dt → 0+, and rescaling time in order to get rid off the term
2δ/(N − 1), we can rewrite it as
dp
(i)
l
dt
= p
(i)
l e
T
l H
(
p¯− 1
N
p(i)
)
− p(i)Hel
(
p¯l − 1
N
p
(i)
l
)
.
Moreover, p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp
(i) =
∑
m p
(i)
l hlmp
(i)
m = −∑m p(i)l hmlp(i)m = −p(i)Help(i)l
since H is antisymmetric, and we have, for 1 ≤ l ≤ K,
dp
(i)
l
dt
= p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp¯− p(i)Help¯l −
2
N
p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp
(i). (3)
We have obtained a system of nonlinear coupled differential equations governing
the probabilities updates for the mixed strategy of each player. Let us mention
that, when N →∞, the previous equations can be simplified to
dp
(i)
l
dt
= p
(i)
l (t)e
T
l Hp¯(t)− p(i)(t)Help¯l(t). (4)
Despite the ugly aspect of Eqns. (3) and (4), they can be solved explicitly in
several interesting cases. As an example, we will study later two prototypical cases,
2× 2 games, and the rock-paper-scissors game.
However, as we will see later in the analysis of the steady state of the wealth
distribution problem, the individual probabilities p(i) are unimportant, and the
relevant information came from their mean value p¯(t). So, we need to derive a
system of ordinary equations for p¯(t). We have the following result:
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Theorem 3.1. Let p¯ be the mean strategy of the population. Then p¯ satisfies the
following equation
dp¯l
dt
= 2p¯le
T
l Hp¯− 2p¯THp¯−
2
N2
∑
i
p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp
(i). (5)
Proof. For any N fixed, we have p¯ = N−1
∑
i p
(i) and
dp¯l
dt
=N−1
∑
i
dp
(i)
l
dt
=N−1
∑
i
[
p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp¯− p(i)Help¯l −
2
N
p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp
(i)
]
=p¯le
T
l Hp¯− p¯Help¯l −
2
N2
∑
i
p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp
(i).
Now, using that HT = −H, we have
p¯le
T
l Hp¯ =
∑
m
p¯lhlmp¯m,
p¯Help¯l =
∑
m
p¯mhmlp¯l = −
∑
m
p¯mhlmp¯l,
and we get
dp¯l
dt
= 2p¯le
T
l Hp¯−
2
N2
∑
i
p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp
(i).
We can rewrite the equation as
dp¯l
dt
= 2p¯le
T
l Hp¯− 2p¯THp¯−
2
N2
∑
i
p
(i)
l e
T
l Hp
(i),
using, as before, that p¯THp¯ =
∑
l
∑
m p¯lp¯mhlm = 0 since hlm = −hml, and the
proof is finished. 
Remark 3.1. Let us observe that, when N →∞, and after rescaling time to cancel
the factor 2, we obtain that p¯(t) satisfy the replicator equation,
dp¯l
dt
= p¯le
T
l Hp¯− p¯THp¯. (6)
As a consequence, the vast literature in this equation enable us to characterize
the convergence of p¯ to a precise vector which correspond to a Nash equilibrium
in several interesting cases. However, let us recall that there are fixed points of
equation (6) which are not Nash equilibria, and not every Nash equilibrium is an
asymptotically stable equilibrium, see [10] for a short recent survey.
4. Two particular games and finite size effects
Let us analyze the dynamics of the previous section for 2 × 2 games and the
family of generalized rock-paper-scissors games.
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4.1. 2 × 2 games. Let us suppose that we have a nontrivial game with only two
strategies. There are two possible matrices H associated to the game, let us assume
that
H =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
,
the other one is −H, and the results can be easily adapted for this case.
For large N , using Equation (4) we have
dp
(i)
1
dt
= p
(i)
1 (t)(1− p¯1(t)) + (1− p(i)1 (t))p¯1(t),
Let us note that the equation for p
(i)
2 is not necessary since p
(i)
2 = 1− p(i)1 .
This problem has only two equilibria: p(i) = e1 for every player i, or p
(i) = e2
for every player i. Also, a simple perturbation analysis shows that only p(i) = e1 is
stable.
In fact, near the equilibria p¯ = e2, if we set p
(i)
1 ≈ εi, then
dp
(i)
1
dt
≥ εi(1− a) + (1− εi)a > 0
for a = N−1
∑
εi ≈ 0, and then p(i)1 increases.
4.1.1. Finitely many players, N > 3. If we consider the finite size effect of the
population, Equation (3) reads
dp
(i)
1
dt
= p
(i)
1 (1− p¯1) + (1− p(i)1 )p¯1 −
2
N
p
(i)
1 (1− p(i)1 ) (7)
Again, the equilibria are the same as before, although the stability analysis is
slightly harder.
If we call p = (p
(1)
1 , · · · , p(N)1 ), we have
dp
dt
= F (p),
where F : RN → RN , where each component of F is given by the right hand side of
Equation (7). In order to prove that the equilibrium p = 0 is unstable, we linearize
this system at the equilibrium point and we show that all the eigenvalues of DF (0)
have strictly positive real part.
Let us observe the diagonal coefficients of DF (0) are given by
DF (0)ii = 1− 1
N
while the remaining coefficients are DF (0)ij = 1/N for i 6= j.
Being a symmetric matrix, we know that the eigenvalues are real. This matrix
cannot have a negative eigenvalue, and we can give a shorter theoretical argument
using that
DF (0) =
(
1− 2
N
)
Id+
1
N
1s
where Id is the identity matrix, and 1s is a matrix of all ones.
Lemma 4.1. The smaller eigenvalue of DF (0) is greater than 1− 2/N .
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Proof. The smaller eigenvalue λ1 of DF (0) can be characterized as
λ1 = inf{v∈RN :‖v‖=1}
vTDF (0)v
Let us note that Id is strictly definite positive, and 1s is semidefinite positive, so
λ1 = inf{v∈RN :‖v‖=1}
vTDF (0)v
≥
(
1− 2
N
)
inf
{v∈RN :‖v‖=1}
vT Idv +
1
N
inf
{v∈RN :‖v‖=1}
vT 1sv
≥
(
1− 2
N
)
,
and the Lemma is proved. 
A similar argument, linearizing at p = 1, gives that this is an stable equilibrium.
Therefore, the players learn the optimal strategy of the game, p
(i)
1 = 1.
4.1.2. Rock-paper-scissors. Let us consider this popular game, which is a very im-
portant example in evolutionary game theory. The generalized rock-paper-scissors
game is defined through the following matrix,
G =
 0 −a bb 0 −a
−a b 0
 ,
with a, b > 0. The only Nash equilibrium is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), and the solutions of
the replicator equation converge, diverge or rotate depending on the relationship
between a and b, see Chapter 7 in [7].
Here, for the different winner/looser payoffs, the matrix H is always
H =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 ,
and in this case we have
dp
(i)
1
dt
=p
(i)
1 e1Hp¯ = p
(i)
1 (1− p¯1 − 2p¯2) + p¯1(1− p(i)1 − 2p(i)2 ),
dp
(i)
2
dt
=p
(i)
2 e2Hp¯ = −p(i)2 (1− 2p¯1 − p¯2)− p¯2(1− 2p(i)1 − p(i)2 ),
and by rescaling time, the equation for p¯ is given by
dp¯1
dt
=p¯1(1− p¯1 − 2p¯2),
dp¯2
dt
=− p¯2(1− 2p¯1 − p¯2).
Linearizing the previous systems at the Nash equilibria (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), we find that
p(i) and p¯ describe periodic orbits. So, the players strategies and the mean strategy
of the population fail to converge.
However, an striking point observed in the simulations was the convergence
p¯(t)→ (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
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Figure 1. Evolution of (p¯1, p¯2) for the rock-paper-scissors game.
Initially, 104 players started near (1/2, 1/2, 0). In the simulation
they performed 4× 106 random matches with δ = 0.05.
as t→∞, see Figure 1.
This seems to be a finite size effect, which can be understood by analyzing the
system of equations given by (3). In this case, we get that DF (0) ∈ R2N×2N is a
block matrix, and computations with Octave, for different values of N , show that
it has purely imaginary eigenvalues. Hence, the evolution of the mixed strategy
of each agent follows a periodic orbit centered at (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). However, the
random perturbations of the orbits and the different initial positions generate a
diffusive effect, and they are scattered around the fixed point. See the snapshots
in Figure 2, where the solid line correspond to the strategy of the mean strategy,
which converges to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
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Figure 2. Diffusion of the players on the simplex of strategies.
The first image is the initial distribution of the players, and the
next ones are snapshots at steps 5, 10, 45, 100, and 1000. In each
step, every agent is sequentially selected and randomly matched
with another player.The solid line correspond to the trajectory of
the mean strategy of the population.
5. Wealth distribution among the agents
In this section we present the effect of the games on the wealth distribution
curves. We start with two strategies games and then we consider the rock-paper-
scissors game. Let us observe that in the former case, the players learn how to play
the optimal pure strategy, and then the wealth distribution frozen since the payoff
at equilibrium is zero; we are interested here in the initial advantage of a player
who is close to the optimal strategy. In the latter case, the agents play a mixed
strategy, and we compute the expected value of the variance due to the fluctuations
of agents wealth; we find a remarkable agreement with the simulations.
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Let us introduce the family of probability densities {Pt(w)}t≥0, and the proba-
bility to find an agent whose wealth belong to some interval (a, b) at time t is given
by ∫ b
a
Pt(w)dw.
Now we compute the variance of Pt(w) in order to compare it with our simula-
tions. We have the following result:
Theorem 5.1. Let G be the matrix of a symmetric zero sum game, and let us
consider the wealth evolution process generated by the microscopic interaction rule
(1). Let us assume that the players are playing a mixed Nash equilibrium p, and
that they are selected at random from the distribution Pt. Then, for sufficiently
small ε, we have
lim
t→∞E(w
2) =
〈G+〉
−ε〈G+2〉+ 〈G+〉 ,
where
〈G±〉 = ε−1
∫∫
pG±ε p
′ Pt(w)Pt(w′)dwdw′
〈G±2〉 = ε−2
∫∫
(pG±ε p
′)2 Pt(w)Pt(w′)dwdw′,
Proof. Using the interaction rule, and the distribution of players we have
d
dt
E(w2) =
d
dt
∫
w2Pt(w)dw
=
∫∫ [
(w + pG+ε p
′w′ − pG−ε p′w)2 − w2
]
Pt(w)Pt(w
′)dwdw′
=
∫∫ [
(pG+ε p
′)2(w′)2 + 2ww′(pG+ε p
′)
]
Pt(w)Pt(w
′)dwdw′
+
∫∫ [
(pG−ε p
′)2 − 2(pG−ε p′)
]
(w)2Pt(w)Pt(w
′)dwdw′
−
∫∫
(pG+ε p
′)(pG−ε p
′)ww′Pt(w)Pt(w′)dwdw′.
We use now that E(w2) = E(w′2), E(w) = E(w′) = 1 and that∫∫
(pG+ε p
′)(pG−ε p
′)ww′Pt(w)Pt(w′)dwdw′ = 0,
since for each pure strategy, one of the two games is equal to zero. Therefore,
d
dt
E(w2) =ε2〈G+2〉E(w2) + 2ε〈G+〉
+ ε2〈G−2〉E(w2)− 2ε〈G−〉E(w2)
We observe that u(t) = E(w2) is a solution of the ordinary differential equation
d
dt
u(t) = Au(t) +B,
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for A = ε2〈G+2〉+ ε2〈G−2〉−2ε〈G−〉, and B = 2ε〈G+〉, with some initial condition
u0 = E(w20) depending on the initial distribution of wealth. The explicit solution is
E(w2) = C(A, u0)exp(At)−A−1B,
and
lim
t→∞E(w
2) =
−2〈G+〉
ε〈G+2〉+ ε〈G−2〉 − 2〈G−〉
since A < 0 for ε small enough.
The result follows since 〈G+〉 = 〈G−〉 and 〈G+2〉 = 〈G−2〉 due to the symmetry
of the game, and the proof is finished. 
Let us remark that the previous proof holds in the limit of infinitely many players.
Of course, if the number of players is finite, we can understand Pt as a sum of Dirac’s
delta functions.
5.1. Simulations for 2 × 2 games. We have considered a symmetric game with
two strategies s1 and s2, and the pay-off matrix G has the form
G =
(
0 ε
−ε 0
)
for ε ∈ (0, 1).
As was proved in Subsection 4.1, we observe that all the players learn how to
play the optimal strategy. As a consequence, the wealth distribution reaches an
equilibrium which is highly dependent on the duration of the transient state while
the agents learn the optimal way of play, and then is frozen. So, it is interesting to
study the effect of the strategy update step δ on the steady state.
In the following figures we have run Algorithm 1 with 104 agents, each agent with
wealth 1, and ε = 0.1. We have fixed the vector of initial strategies for each player
and we have performed 100 simulations starting with these initial strategies. In
Figure 3 we observe the mean steady state curve for these simulations, for δ = 0.1
(left), δ = 0.01 (center), and δ = 0.001 (right).
In Figure 4 we show the mean wealth obtained at the steady state for the agents
as a function of their initial strategy. The horizontal axis represent the probability
that an agent play the optimal strategy, and clearly the ones which started with a
high probability to play it become more wealthier. Here, the value of δ determines
the duration of the transient state, where the wealth exchange takes place. We
have δ = 0.1 (left), δ = 0.01 (center), and δ = 0.001 (right).
5.2. The Rock-paper-scissors game. Let us consider now the Rock-paper-scissors
game from Subsection 4.1.2. We fix a = b = 1, and we scale the game with different
parameters ε ∈ (0, 1).
In Figure 5 we show several histograms, for different values of ε, of the wealth
distribution for N = 104 agents, averaged over 10 realizations starting all of them
with the same initial strategies, and each agent has initial wealth equal to 1. Let
us note that we have less equalitarian distributions when ε approaches 1. In fact,
for ε = 1, all the wealth is transferred to the winner player, and in the long run, it
accumulates in a single player.
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Figure 3. Steady state of the wealth for different values of δ,
δ = 0.1 (left), δ = 0.01 (center), and δ = 0.001 (right). We av-
eraged 100 simulations with N = 104 agents and the same initial
distribution of strategies.
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Figure 4. Mean wealth of agents (vertical axis) depending on
their initial probability to play the optimal strategy (horizontal
axis), for different values of δ, δ = 0.1 (left), δ = 0.01 (center),
and δ = 0.001 (right). We averaged 100 simulations with N = 104
agents and the same initial distribution of strategies.
The solid lines in Figure 5 represent the Gamma function
Γ(x) =
vv exp(−vx)
Γ(v)x1−v
,
where v = v(ε) is the sample variance of the data in each case. We show in Table
1 that the sample variance and the theoretical value ε(1− ε)−1 are very close.
The value v(ε) = ε(1−ε)−1 can be computed from Theorem 5.1, or using directly
the interaction rule, from
w∗i = wi + ε(g
+
lmwj − g−lmwi).
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Value of ε Sample variance Theoretical value Relative error
0.1 0.1114 0.1111 0.0030
0.3 0.4365 0.4286 0.0185
0.5 1.0098 1.0000 0.0098
0.7 2.3635 2.3333 0.0129
0.9 9.0967 9.0000 0.0107
Table 1. Variance of Gamma distribution depending of the value
of ε.
Let us note that the expected value of wi is E(wi) = 1, hence the variance is
V ar(wi) = E(w2i )− 1.
Let us call V = E(w2i ). The linearity of the expected value, and the independence
implies
E([w∗i ]2) =E([wi + εg
+
lmwj − εg−lmwi]2)
=E([wi]2) + E([εg+lmwj ]
2) + E([εg−lmwi]
2) + 2E(εg+lmwjwi)
− 2E(εg−lmw2i )− 2E(ε2g+lmg−lmwjwi).
Therefore,
V = V + ε2E([g+lm]
2)V + ε2E([g−lm]
2)V + ε2E(g+lm)− 2εE(g−lm)V − ε22E(g+lmg−lm),
which gives
V =
2E(g+lm)− ε2E(g+lmg−lm)
2E(g−lm)− εE([g+lm]2)− εE([g−lm]2)
Using that
E(g+lm) = E(g
−
lm) = E([g
−
lm]
2) = E([g+lm]
2) =
1
3
,
and E(g+lmg
−
lm) = 0 since one of them must be zero, we get
V =
2
3
2
3 − 2ε3
=
1
1− ε
and thus
V ar(wi) =
ε
1− ε ,
as stated before.
6. Conclusions
In this work we have studied the wealth distribution problem when the agents
interact through a zero sum game, which determine the wealth transfer. Moreover,
we have studied the evolutive process, for agents using mixed strategies.
We have proposed a Pavlovian type of agents, which update their strategies
myopically as a result of the last game they played, without trying to find the best
response, or changing strategies proportionally to looses and gains, but reinforcing
the winning strategy and penalizing the loosing strategy. A theoretical analysis
of this simple dynamic gives a system of ordinary differential equations for the
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Figure 5. Histogram of the wealth distribution with N = 104
agents, averaged over 10 realizations, starting each one with wealth
equal to 1. The solid line represent the Gamma function of param-
eter v = v(ε).
evolution of each agent strategies, and the mean strategy of the population solves
a system very close to the replicator equation.
The wealth evolution of the population is similar to the one observed in more
simple models where the interaction between agents is restricted to a random ex-
change of wealth. By scaling the game payoff we reproduce the saving propensity
phenomena, and different Gamma-like curves appears as the steady state as a func-
tion of the scaling parameter.
Two different scenarios appear depending on the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Since the game is symmetric, its value is zero, and when the Nash equilibrium is
a pure strategy, the wealth transfer stops whenever the agents learn how to play
in the optimal way. In this case we have more equalitarian distribution of wealth
when they quickly update their strategies, and less equalitarian distribution when
the evolutionary process is slow.
However, when the Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy, the wealth transfer
continues due to the random results of each individual game, and the steady state
for the wealth distribution resembles the curves obtained using purely random ways
to determine the wealth transfer. The shape of the steady state varies with the
proportion of the agent’s wealth that is involved in each transaction, and more
equalitarian distributions are obtained when this proportion is small, and if we
allow to exchange almost all the wealth in a single game, we get a distribution
strongly concentrated near zero, since wealth is accumulated in few individuals.
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Finally, two directions seem promising. In the limit of infinitely many players
we can expect a system of two coupled Boltzmann equations, one describing the
evolutionary process on the simplex of strategies, and the other one modeling the
wealth exchange.
On the other hand, new situations can occur whenever the agents play an arbi-
trary game. Beside the dichotomy between pure and mixed equilibria, we can have
more than one equilibria, with different payoffs, and different kind of wealth distri-
bution can appear depending on the limit equilibria selected by the dynamics. Let
us remak that in this case the wealth is not conserved, and some kind of rescaling
will be needed in order to study the asymptotic behavior of the wealth distribution.
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